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CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXISTENCE, 
DEVOUT PHYSICALISM, SPIRITUALISM
by Ted Honderich
This paper, the fifth on a theme, is the main source of talks given to the Toward the 
Science of Consciousness Conference for 2003 in Prague and the same conference 
for 2005 in Copenhagen. It is a departure from traditional and still orthodox 
accounts of consciousness, mind and brain, and the explanation of mental events. For 
an argued survey of these accounts, and a particular allegiance now abandoned in 
favour of Consciousness as Existence, go to Mind Brain Connection and Mind and 
Brain Explanation.
Abstract: Consider three answers to the question of what it actually is for you to be aware of the 
room you are in. (1) It is for the room in a way to exist. (2) It is for there to be only physical 
activity in your head, however additionally described. (3) It is for there to be non-spatial facts 
somehow in your head. The first theory, unlike the other two, satisfies criteria for an adequate 
account of consciousness itself. The criteria have to do with the seeming nature of this 
consciousness, and with subjectivity, reality and non-abstractness, mind-body causation, and the 
differences between perceptual, reflective and affective consciousness. The theory of 
consciousness as existence is not open to the objection of a deluded brain in a vat. The theory 
explains its own degree of failure in characterizing consciousness. It releases neuroscience and 
cognitive science from nervousness about consciousness, and leaves all of consciousness a 
subject for science. The theory is a reconstruction of our conception of consciousness. It may be 
that we should carry forward several theories of consciousness. But they will have to be 
compared in terms of truth to the criteria for an adequate theory. 
1. Perceptual Consciousness as Existence
   There has been a kind of reminder but no decent definition in the idea that for a 
thing to be conscious is for there to be something it is like to be that thing (Sprigge, 
1971; Nagel, 1974). This is so because of the circularity of the mouthful. You can 
only make sense of it by taking it as this: for a thing to be conscious is for there to be 
something it is like for that thing to be conscious. So consciousness is not in sight of 
being defined along these lines as a way of being. You can get well on the way to that 
disappointing truth just by noticing Searle's approving remark that there is something 
it is like to be a dolphin, but not something it is like to be a shingle on a roof (Searle, 
1992, p. 132). He doesn't see he lets the cat out of the bag.
   But you can usefully just ask what it is like to be conscious. You can usefully ask 
yourself what it is like for you to be conscious of this room right now. That is, you 
can ask for the seeming nature of the fact or thing to you, the appearance of it, the 
phenomenology of it. This might of course be the real nature too -- some appearances 
are also the reality, the very nature of the thing. 
There is a good answer to the question of what it is like for you to be conscious of or 
aware of this room now. For you to be conscious of the room is, it seems, for the 
room somehow to exist. Not you, but the room. In fact there is no better 
phenomenological answer so-called. Is it not superior to all others? 
Think of the family of answers that what it is like for you to be conscious of this 
room now is for there to be a thing or substance and stuff out of space, but still 
somehow in your head (Descartes, 1641, 1649). The mysterious tension or 
contradiction about space probably helps this answer, since being conscious seems as 
well as is mysterious to us, but it leaves the answer as thin as it is. 
Think of another family of answers. What is like for you to be conscious of this room 
now is for for there to be a neural instantiation in your head of a computational or 
functional sequence (Kim, 1998, Chs. 4, 5). Or an electromagnetic field (Pocket, 
2002). Or, God help us, what your consciousness seems to be to you is a generating 
in your head of macroscopic quantum coherence, with Bose Einstein condensates 
combining and microtubules microtubuling (McFadden, 2002).
   These answers to the phenomenological question are of course taken directly from 
two families of views as to the very nature of your consciousness. They are the best 
phenomenological answers those views can give. Those views are not strengthened 
by abandoning themselves, so to speak, and telling some ad hoc tale, as the 
physicalist ones do, when they turn to the matter of so-called appearances. Our 
consciousness itself, after all, whatever depth or process or machinery or other fact 
underlies or explains it, is not itself hidden from us. None of it is hidden, whatever 
else may be. If you maintain consciousness as distinct from anything else really is 
something, you should show us this accords with its seeming nature.
   You can make absolutely literal sense of the idea that what it is to be conscious of 
this room is the room's somehow existing. 
For you in particular to be conscious of this room now is for there to be things 
somehow existing outside of your head, for a state of affairs somehow to be there, a 
kind of world. That is to say, firstly, that the things are in space-time and that they 
have other properties, such as colour. Some can be called chairs. To say that this state 
of affairs exists is to say, secondly, that the chairs and so on (a) depend on the way 
underlying things are -- atoms, fields etc. -- and also that the chairs and so on (b) 
depend on you, on how you are perceptually and also conceptually, and, more 
particularly, on you neurally or on some of your neural processes. 
This way of existence of the chairs and the like makes this state of affairs like another 
-- it is tempting to say it is about as real as another. 
That other one is the physical existence of the room at a certain level. That consists in 
things being in space and time, and (a) dependent on underlying things -- atoms, 
fields etc. -- and also (b) dependent not on a particular person but rather on perceiving 
persons in general or maybe qualified perceiving persons in general. You can add 
again that really it is dependency on all their neural processes.
   The pretty ordinary idea in play here is that the physical world is things in space-
time with perceived properties like colour and also things in space-time without 
perceived properties but in causal connection with the first lot of things (Quinton, 
1973). The physical world is at two levels -- chairs etc. and atoms etc. 
So, to repeat, what it is for you to be conscious of the room is a fact outside your 
head, quite similar to but not the same as the fact of the perceived and public physical 
world outside your head. 
Both are out there. Neither is mysterious. Your world of perceptual consciousness 
and my different one are not made 'mental' in a funny or unanalysed sense by 
particular human dependencies -- no more than the perceived physical world is made 
so by its general human dependency. None of this has anything to do with Bishop 
Berkeley or the dictum that to be is just to be perceived (Honderich, 1998, pp. 148-
155, 1999, pp. 69-71).
Worlds of perceptual consciousness are in fact epistemologically prior and less 
theorized that the physical world in either of its levels. Views from somehow come 
before and are no such abstractions as the view compounded from nowhere. Certainly 
there is what we call the world seen my way -- and, incidentally, if it isn't my 
perceptual consciousness, what is it?
 Ask, certainly, why anyone would want to think along these near-physicalist or 
naturalist lines about perceptual consciousness -- want to try on what can be called 
the idea of consciousness as existence with respect to perceptual consciousness 
(Honderich, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003). 
The reason is that very generally speaking there are only two other sorts of answers, 
touched on a moment ago, to the question of the nature of consciousness, and they are 
still terrible. Nobody believes the first option when they are not half-dreaming. 
Nobody believes the second when they are not overcome by science in a certain way 
or trying to get through the peer-review of the Journal for Consciousness Studies --
which, I must tell you confidentially, the paper you are hearing did not. Let me say a 
word about the two sorts of views.
2. Spiritualism, Devout Physicalism
First, you can half-dream that that what still has the misleading name of dualism is 
the case -- that consciousness is a non-spatial thing and stuff, maybe somehow in the 
head. Or rather, you can be committed to something like this, however quiet you are 
and however much you keep your head down, by being unable to swallow devout or 
real physicalism and having nothing else to say. This is probably the position of most 
philosophers, maybe even most philosophers of mind.
It shouldn't be called dualism, though, for a few reasons. One is that these days most 
monisms, identity theories, physicalisms and even materialisms are dualistic in the 
sense of adding something else to physical properties or ordinary physical properties. 
Davidson says his monism is not nothing-but materialism (1980). Searle's impulse to 
and inconsistency about dualism is plain (Honderich, 1995). The idea that 
consciousness is non-spatial is better called spiritualism, in a bare use of the term that 
makes it equivalent to dualism in another and traditional use of that term. 
Whether or not a dualism in the contemporary sense is also a spiritualism, which may 
not be easy to tell, it is likely to be something else that it will be useful to name -- a 
cranialism. That is a view that just locates consciousness in the head. It does so 
despite our universal reluctance actually to say Yes when faced with the question of 
whether our consciousness is something in our head (Honderich, 2003, pp. 7, 19).
The other option from spiritualism is the devout physicalism. You can say and write, 
in a career that keeps an eye on some of science, maybe two, and is forgetful of 
reflective experience, that being conscious or aware of something has only physical 
properties in the head. So devout physicalism is that being aware of something has 
only neural properties -- thought of computationally or with microtubules to the fore 
or in any other way you like. This other cranialism may or may not be involved in 
some sort of dualism in the contemporary sense. The name of devout physicalism is a 
reminder that for it, at bottom, and despite the elaborations, consciousness remains 
only physical properties in the head.
Nobody not on the philosophical job of trying to approximate more to some of 
science believes this either. What we all know, to make use of a pefectly proper and 
enlightening parody, is that consciousness, isn't just cells, however fancily or 
fancifully conceived. Everybody on the job tries to give a place to or register what 
they know when they're not on the job. But they can't do it if they have it that 
consciousness has only neural properties or conceivably silicon or otherwise physical 
properties, no matter how they are conceived additionally.
The different view gestured at so far, consciousness as existence with respect to 
perceptual consciousness, is certainly closer to devout physicalism than to 
spiritualism. Despite being a contemporary dualism, like so much else, it is indeed 
near-physicalism.
Another way of seeing it is that it takes perceptual consciousness to be fairly close to 
what some others call just the content of perceptual consciousness. The same is true, 
although the rest of the story is different, with what you can call the other two parts, 
sides or elements of consciousness. Those are reflective or cognitive consciousness, 
and affective or somehow desirous consciousness.
But let me pause for a moment to protest that I am not mad as a hatter, or as an 
epiphenomenalist. 
It would be mad to say, as a piece of conceptual or linguistic analysis, that what we 
ordinarily have in mind in talking of being aware of this room, and talking of 
perceptual consciousness generally, is a state of affairs outside the head. Cranialism 
has a hold on us and our language. It would be and is as mad to say, by the way and 
of course, that what we ordinarily have in mind in talking of being aware of this room 
is something in the head -- neural clicking or pulsing of whatever kind, or even 
clicking or pulsing in part.
The enterprise in hand, rather, instead of being conceptual or linguistic analysis, is 
one of conceptual construction or reconstruction, of which a little more will be said in 
the end. For now, to go further with that job, notice that there are widely-agreed 
criteria of adequacy for a concept or conception of consciousness, widely-agreed 
constraints on a good one. 
3. Conciousness-Criteria, and Reflective and Affective Consciousness
One criterion of adequacy is the phenomenological one, so-called, of which you have 
heard something in connection with your being aware of this room and of which more 
can be said (Honderich 1999, p.67). 
Another criterion, the main one in some sense, is that a good conception has to 
recognize and give real and unique sense to our conviction of the subjectivity of 
consciousness. Subjectivity has to be made sense of, not denied, reduced or replaced.
A third criterion is making consciousness real as against abstract, which means 
physical or close to it. That, by the way, excludes what you can call abstract 
functionalism or abstract cognitive science both from any physicalism and from being 
a real starter in the consciousness stakes (Kim, 1998, Chs 4, 5; Honderich, 1995, p. 
369). 
A fourth criterion is that an account has to make mind-body or consciousness-
physicality causal interaction possible and indeed ordinary. 
A fifth is that a good account of consciousness has to make it different in its three 
parts, sides or elements, which plainly it is, and probably to make perceptual 
consciousness somehow fundamental and permeating.
Our most laboured-on conceptions of consciousness these days, all the devout 
physicalist theorizing in the best journal on the subject, are mainly products of a 
simple and pious attention to the third or reality criterion, and a reasonable attention 
to the fourth one about causal interaction. The laboured-on ideas, despite declamation 
and philosophically-unproductive technicality, fail the second or subjectivity test 
dismally. Subjectivity certainly isn't cells. As you have already heard, they also fail 
the first or phenomenological test. Abstract functionalism, by the way, evidently fails 
not only the third test, about physicality or something close to it, but also the causal 
interaction test. The laboured-on ideas, and abstract functionalism, do badly on the 
fifth test too, about differences in consciousness.
Consider if the reconstruction being proposed does better, anyway with perceptual 
consciousness. What it seems to be for you to be aware of this room is surely for the 
room to exist in a clear sense. But above all, the big difference between 
consciousness and all else is really catered for in the reconstruction -- we have a clear 
sense in which consciousness truly is subjective (Honderich, 1999, p. 71; 2001, p. 7). 
The state of affairs that is your awareness isn't mine, and it isn't ever the physical 
state of affairs either. It can be a lot different in its properties. So too does the 
reconstruction do well with causal interaction and the other tests (Honderich, 1999, p. 
73; 2003, pp. 2, 7). 
So -- what it is for someone to be conscious of this room is for things to have 
properties, be in relations, undergo the changes that are events -- as a result of both 
things in your head and things underlying the ones in the state of affairs. But have 
you been digging in and saying that this state of affairs can be redescribed more 
plainly just as a property or attribute of the person? That we ordinarily say that 
consciousness is a property of a person and we can stick to this line here?
Well of course you can say something like that. You can say that somewhere's having 
a three-piece suite in it is an armchair's having the property of having another one 
next to it and also a sofa. Or that the Atlantic Ocean is in fact a large basin in the 
earth's surface having the property of being full of water. But your being conscious is 
no more a property of you, strictly speaking, than it is of the underpinning atoms and 
what-not. Your being conscious, on the present story, is ordinarily and more 
enlighteningly described as a state of affairs including the several things.
   Certainly, on this story, your being conscious is not just the particular fact of the 
state of affairs being in part dependent on your neural activity. That dependency-
relationship, reportable by a true conditional proposition, does not begin to have the 
features required by the five criteria of consciousness. No doubt there might be profit 
in a lot more reflection on things or substances, properties, relations, events, states of 
affairs, worlds and so on -- in short on the categories of reality, the metaphysics 
implicit in all our talk. But we have a grip on these things in advance of the further 
reflection.
   It seems to me that to insist that your being conscious has to be your having a 
property, where that is to insist on more than the possible careless use of an 
expression, is just to be wedded to the sort of idea to which consciousness as 
existence is opposed. So your proper response is to dispute what is said for the 
theory. Let us have your argument.
To say a word now not about perceptual but rather about reflective and affective 
consciousness, the account of them in terms of consciousness as existence is less 
neat. But it does continue the same story (Honderich, 2003). And it does make 
perceptual consciousness pretty fundamental and certainly permeating with respect to 
reflective and affective consciousness -- thinking and desiring in general.
Reflective consciousness consists, first, in the existence of representations or symbols 
in perceptual consciousness -- i.e. actual things in space-time with the character of all 
symbols. That character, in brief, is that they have some of the causal properties of 
the things represented. Reflective consciousness, secondly, consists not in these 
external but rather in internal representations -- a personal language of thought and 
feeling if you like (cf. Fodor, 1979).
So, what other call the contents of reflective consciousness are upgraded into the 
thing or stuff itself. In the conciousness there is no funny relationship to the 
representations. Whatever multitude of relations may be involved, including a causal 
one issuing in the activating of representations, no such relationship with a self or 
whatever is part of my thinking in its various forms.
Affective or desire-related consciousness is in that respect the same -- no internal 
relationship. It consists, firstly, in things in perceptual consciousness being of certain 
kinds that we ordinarily desire: bigger, faster, quieter, deadlier and so on. It is, 
secondly, certain bodily things -- say the sensations connected with fear. It is, thirdly, 
representations of behaviour or action.
The existence-conditions or dependence-conditions of the parts of reflective and 
affective consciousness that are not in perceptual consciousness will be analagous to 
those parts that are in it. With these internal representations, there will be a kind of 
double-dependency, related to both the double dependencies of things of perceptual 
consciousness and things of the perceived physical world. The story is as close to 
devout physicalism as you can get and still be true to the subject-matter of 
consciousness -- what it's like for a start, to remember the first criterion of adequacy, 
and also its subjectivity and so on.
Since it's also the case that the theory of consciousness as existence is different from 
what has been going on in the philosophy of mind, let alone the science of mind, 
which is different, let me say some more about it. Three things in particular -- about 
past theories of perception and brains in vats, consciousness as baffling, and 
consciousness as existence in relation to neuroscience and some attendant philosophy 
of mind.
4. Representative Theory, Realist Theory
Consciousness as existence, in so far as it concerns perceptual consciousness, is a 
little closer to one of the two families of theories of perception in the past of 
philosophy and indeed its present. 
One is the representative theory of perception, or phenomenalism. It is to the effect 
that what you are aware of and what I am aware of when, as we say, we both see the 
chair, is not numerically one thing. I am aware of my sense-datum, percept, sensation 
or whatever, and you are aware of yours. However qualitatively alike, there are two 
of these internal things to which we are limited in our perceptual experience. Such a 
theory is of course identified with the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The 
best discussion of it in the 20th Century, and a tentative defence, was given by A. J. 
Ayer (1973)
The other theory of perception is closer to ordinary belief. It has the tremendous 
recommendation, as against the representative theory, of getting each of us out of 
solitary confinement. It is that when you and I see the chair, as we say, what we are 
aware of is indeed one thing, a physical object. If the representative theory, as 
Dretske (1995) usefully remarks, confines us in our seeing to mental television, the 
realist theory (Price, 1932) saves us from this, puts us in touch with the real world. 
But what this relation, this being-directly-in-touch-with, comes to -- this is not clear 
at all. Remember that the realist theory is indeed about consciousness in the widely-
shared sense, not the relation of photons, retinas and the visual cortex.
The theory of perceptual consciousness as existence is evidently a little closer to the 
realist theory. The existence theory is also about something outside the head, and on 
the way to being physical. As against this, there is a large difference between the 
existence theory and the realist theory, and also between the existence theory and the 
representation theory of perception. It has to do with relations. 
The realist theory necessarily involves not only the physical world but the unclear 
relation to it. The relation has to be in there. How it is to be conceived is indeed 
unclear -- all that has ever been said is that it is not an inferential relation, certainly 
not a relation of conscious inference. More generally, it's not a relationship such that 
one becomes aware of something, maybe a chair, by in a prior sense being aware of 
something else. Don't say the relation isn't photons and so on but is just seeing, by the 
way -- that's what we're supposed to be analysing. 
An obscure relation has been as much a part of all representative theories, I suspect. 
Brentano's idea of consciousness serves as an example (Brentano, 1973; Bell, 1990, 
Ch. 1). When I see a chair, as we ordinarily say, there is something called activity 
directed on an object or activity with reference to a content, which latter things are of 
course internal to the experience and are of the order of a sense-datum, percept or 
whatever. In addition to them there is the directedness. Elsewhere in philosophy, 
there is a lot of stuff, less clear, to the effect that all consciousness is or includes self-
consciousness -- here too something is added to an internal content.
It is a further recommendation of consciousness as existence that it does not load a 
funny relation into its conception of consciousness itself. Needless to say, your 
awareness of this room involves the dependency-relations that have been mentioned -
- to your neural activity and also a world of atoms etc. That is not to say that what it 
is for you to be conscious of this room includes in itself a relation to something. What 
your consciousness consists in no more includes relations explanatory of it than an 
apple includes its relation to a tree.
5. Deluded Brains in Vats
These remarks about the representative and the realist theories are of use in clarifying 
the theory of consciousness as existence but they also lead to something else. There is 
a terrible objection to the realist theory -- to which, as remarked, consciousness as 
existence is a little closer. The objection is in fact the proposition or family of 
propositions that leads to the representative theory. It has traditionally been known as 
the argument from illusion. It is better named the argument from hallucination, or, if 
you like, the argument from a brain in a vat.
It is not the proposition that there are variations in the experience of different persons 
having to do with their different perceptual situations and equipments -- the look of 
the penny and the warm hand in water and so on (Ayer, 1956, 1973). That we see a 
thing differently, as we say, is no reason for concluding that we do not see one and 
the same thing. You can add that something that did not look different from different 
points of view would not be a physical object.
Rather, the essential proposition is that matters could be arranged so that there did 
occur some perceptual experience that stood in no relation at all to the surrounding 
physical world -- delusion. The brain in the vat in the laboratory is stimulated by 
attendant neuroscientists, it is said, so that the visual cortex and so on carries on in 
such a way that there is experience or awareness as in ordinary experiencing of, say, 
Wenceslas Square. But, ex hypothesi, Wenceslas Square is not there in the laboratory. 
Since there is something indistinguishable from actual perceptual experience of 
Wenceslas Square, it follows that the realist theory of perception is refuted and the 
representative theory is vindicated.
What is also true, you may suppose, is that the account of perceptual consciousness as 
existence is done for. There is no Wenceslas Square in the right place to be the state 
of affairs that is the brain's awareness or experience. Here, as some have said, is a 
disaster that finishes off an unlikely idea.
There have been attempts made by holders of the realist theory to avoid their disaster, 
of course. One is the retort that the brain in the vat wouldn't be seeing Wenceslas 
Square, but just thinking it was seeing it (cf. Snowdon, 1980-1981, McDowell, 1982). 
That is a little factitious, not quite solid enough to defeat all of Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume and Ayer. In fact it seems to me doubtful that the realist theory can by this or 
other means survive the objection.
What is of greater importance now is what is taken as implicit or explicit in that 
theory and certainly is explicit in brain-in-a-vat ruminations. It is that in ordinary 
perceptual consciousness, as in the case of the brain in a vat, there is a neural process 
that is causally or in some other way nomically sufficient for the consciousness. 
There is a complete causal circumstance, wholly neural, for the consciousness. That 
is why it is possible for the attendant neuroscientists to get the brain, as is said, to 
have perceptual consciousness of Wenceslas Square.
Let me forget about the realist theory now and stick to perceptual consciousness as 
existence. The short story is that the brain-in-a-vat rumination does not defeat it, for a 
clear and certain reason. Rather than defeat the given theory of consciousness, the 
brain-in-a-vat offers the possibility of testing the theory.
The theory is that your being aware of this room is a state of affairs in space-time 
outside your head, a local world, that depends both on underlying things -- atoms, etc. 
-- and also on your neural processes. So each of those lots of things, to speak 
ordinarily, is only nomically necessary rather than nomically sufficient for your 
perceptual consciousness. It is only together that the two lots form a causal 
circumstance for the awareness.
So the theory specifically does not have the brain-in-a-vat consequence. Rather, it 
excludes the proposition that a brain in a vat, anyway on current assumptions, could 
possibly be perceptually conscious. There is no neural sufficient condition to be 
assembled. 
Or, to put the matter differently, there is a way that the theory of perceptual 
consciousness as existence could be falsified. It can or could be falsified by 
producing real perceptual consciousness in a brain in a vat. It could be falsified if 
there was as much reason to believe the brain was as conscious of Wenceslas Square 
or this room as there is reason to believe we are when we are there.
You will anticipate that I have to, and happily do, put my money on no brain in a vat 
ever having perceptual experience just as a result of monkeying around with the brain 
itself. There isn't a possible sufficient condition in the brain for a perceptual 
experience. (Cf., alas, Honderich 2003, pp. 75-77)
To change the whole speculation, I guess it's conceivable, a wild theoretical 
possibility, that somebody could produce perceptual experience of the laboratory 
surroundings rather than Wenceslas Square if they added in a perceptual apparatus 
and so on to the brain. Then the situation could approximate to what I say is sufficient 
for perceptual consciousness. If you added in the perceptual apparatus and there still 
wasn't perceptual consciousness -- I guess according to the brain's reports -- then 
consciousness as existence would again be refuted.
But all that is science fiction. The important point is that you cannot refute the idea of 
perceptual consciousness as existence by employing the argument from illusion, 
hallucination or a brain in a vat.
Notice, by the way, that the theory of consciousness as existence does not make all of 
reflective consciousness in itself dependent on both what is outside and what is inside 
a head. In so far as reflective consciousness is a matter of only internal 
representations, which presumably it can be, it is not dependent on anything extra-
cranial. 
So the theory of consciousness as existence, despite what it says about perceptual 
consciousness, doesn't from the start absolutely exclude all successful brain-in-a-vat 
neuroscientific monkeying. That is probably a good thing. My guess is that a lot of 
neuroscientists would say that there are some things their successors may be able to 
do and some things they won't be able to do.
6. Consciousness as Baffling
Let us go on to something related, having to do with the battered old question of 
whether computers could ever be conscious. That is not the question of whether they 
can think in the also battered sense of compute, process information or anything of 
the sort but, in part, the question of whether they can consciously think -- consciously 
think about absent things.
Could a computer consciously think about Wenceslas Square? There is doubt about 
that, which is to say that a lot of well-informed and good judges are uncertain about 
it. As it seems to me, such judges are not just in the grips of habit -- the wide and 
deep habit of restricting consciousness to biological entities, living things. Surely 
there must be some other reason than a prejudice for neurons over silicon that 
explains why we good judges are uncertain. There must be something else about 
consciousness that explains this. It is reasonable to suppose that there must be 
something about consciousness itself that explains the doubt.
That reflection can lead to another one. It is that a good theory of consciousness itself 
will have the recommendation of explaining why we are uncertain about whether 
machines will ever be really conscious. 
To use an analogy, it is rightly said that a good theory of something will include a 
viable explanation of why other people than the theoretician are in error about the 
thing. A good theory of moral judgements, maybe one that makes them a matter of 
desires, will include an error-theory in this sense -- an account of why a lot of other 
people think some moral judgements are really true. Similarly, you can expect a good 
theory of something to explain uncertainty about its subject-matter.
A good theory of consciousness, to mention another analogy, will certainly have to 
give an answer in itself to the question of why there has been a mind-body problem. 
It will have to give an answer to why almost all philosophers have found it hard to 
see how consciousness and brains can interact causally. You can add by the way that 
devout physicalism, in making it incomprehensible that there ever was uncertainty 
already has a strike against it, maybe two.
To get back to the point, or nearer to it, we can contemplate theories of consciousness 
from the point of view of whether they explain why we are uncertain as to whether 
computers will ever be conscious. If you think of the two large familiies of theories 
mentioned at the start, you will not be long in coming to a thought about one of them, 
devout physicalism. If it really were the case that a persuasive reconstruction of 
consciousness was as a sequence of purely neural events, then there wouldn't be any 
reason in principle why computers couldn't be conscious. We wouldn't be uncertain at 
all. We could just say, well, no doubt it will happen some day -- they'll get there.
Let us skip over the spiritualism family in this connection and come to consciousness 
as existence. Can it explain why we are puzzled about what computers might 
become? That question can be subsumed in a larger one. Let us skip to that. 
It is very clear that all of consciousness -- forget about computers -- is somehow 
baffling. To say it is the hard problem (Chalmers, 1996) about our behaviour and its 
antecedents seems to me a wonderful understatement -- as wonderful, incidentally, as 
the idea that there is any other problem at all about consciousness itself. There is 
nothing else at all like this problem about consciousness itself.
So there is a larger challenge for a theory of consciousness: it should have something 
to say about why it is so hard to come to a decent conception of consciousness, about 
why agreement or convergence don't really happen, despite what is said in hopeful 
articles in encylopedias. Indeed, to come to the sharp end, a point that is only 
superficially paradoxical, a good theory of consciousness should explain why it itself 
doesn't secure wide agreement. A good theory of consciousness, in short, needs a 
theory of its own degree of failure. 
   It is a good theory I'm talking about, so it can't be that the theory has in it an 
explanation of its total failure or real hopelessness or anything well on the way to 
that. What we need, then, in a pretty good theory -- one that does well or not badly on 
the other criteria we started with -- is an explanation of a degree of failure. Let us say 
a good theory has to be baffling to a tolerable degree. You will anticipate that it 
seems to me that consciousness as existence does well here.
   This theory makes your consciousness into a plenitude. Consciousness is all of what 
other theories take to be the content of your consciousness, or at least akin to that. It's 
not just a relation to what they call the content. There is a fullness and variety here 
over any minute, indeed a richness -- in perceptual, reflective and affective terms. To 
think of your consciousness over longer time is to think of a plenitude to the power of 
what? This plenitude  has in it your representations or symbols, your intentions in 
action and your hopes and values and other desire-related things, and the flow of 
perception. Your consciousness on this theory is not a relation to an abundance but 
the abundance itself. It is near enough a literal truth that on this theory the fact of 
your consciousness is the fact of your life. 
To come to a simple conclusion quickly, this plenitude that is your life, if you set out 
to think about it, is defeating. To try to sum it up generally in thought, to try to come 
to an analytic abbreviation of it, is necessarily to be in a way baffled. This is no 
sophisticated or chichi point, say about the available capabilities and representations 
and what-not being inside the subject-matter. The point is the size and nature of the 
thing, a life. Your consciousness is not some aspect of a life, just a relation, let alone 
some odd or puzzling feature attendant on computation, but a life itself. There must 
be a good sense in which there is no larger subject-matter.
To look quickly at the competititon, can it be said that spiritualism is a theory of 
consciousness that is to a decent extent baffling? Well, as remarked earlier, some sort 
of spiritualism is in fact a kind of default position, and a lot of philosophers and 
others are in that position. But it is rare nowadays actually to think about 
consciousness and embrace spiritualism. It can barely have the name of a theory, 
since it is more question than answer. What is this gossamer stuff? How can you have 
a cause that is nowhere? And so on. This is not a decent theory with an explanation of 
our resistance to it, but a frustration in itself.
As for devout physicalism, however the pill is coated, I'd better admit that the 
situation seems to me much the same. To put it one way, this theory too is far too 
baffling. Anyone not in a way scientized finds just about ludicrous the idea that their 
consciousness actually consists in no more than action potentials, transmitter-
substances, bits of protein, magnetism, or the like. Since the 17th Century when
Hobbes declared his devout physicalism, just about the most resilient proposition in 
philosophy has been that consciousness isn't just cells (Honderich, 2000). 
7. Neuroscience, and Some Attendant Philosophy
   Let me turn now to the relations between the theory you have before you and 
ordinary neuroscience rather than neuroscience fiction. How does the theory stand to 
it? The first answer is what we already have in connection with the deluded brain in a 
vat. 
It is that it follows from the theory that the business of ordinary neuroscience is the 
discovery and understanding of neural correlates of consciousness in two senses: 
correlates that are necessary conditions and correlates that are sufficient or 
necessitating conditions. The former have to do with perceptual consciousness, the 
latter with reflective and affective consciousness. The distinction has to be 
understood in a way consistent with the intermingling of the three sides of 
consciousness, of which much might be said.
   That it follows from the theory that neurosience is in part concerned with neural 
events and processes that are only necessary conditions of consciousness is in one 
way uncontentious. Finding more necessary conditions, I take it, is the day-to-day 
business of neuroscience (Kandel et al, 1991). To put this point in one way, the day-
to-day business of neuroscience is not discovering laws. It is not the discovery of 
causal circumstances or absolute nomic correlates in the brain for consciousness. 
Neuroscientific laws are thin on the ground.
   Still, it is possible to think that this day-to-day business is carried forward on a 
certain background assumption. It is that for every neural necessary condition for a 
fact of consciousness, there is also some wholly neural sufficient condition of which 
the necessary condition is part, a sufficient condition that in theory could be found. 
Let it be confessed that in the past I myself have put a lot of effort into defending that 
proposition about neuroscience (Honderich, 1988, 1990, Ch. 2). It was, as it now 
seems, wasted effort.
   But let us not fall into any of a number of nearby possible confusions. 
For a great deal of consciousness in the reflective and affective sides of it, according 
to consciousness as existence, there are sufficient or necessitating neural correlates to 
be found in the head. It is only for perceptual consciousness that there are only neural 
necessary conditions to be found. 
That does not mean that are no sufficient or necessitating correlates for perceptual 
consciousness, but simply that they are both inside and outside the head. 
Hence there is no mysterious departure here from a decent assumption of lawlikeness 
or determinism. All of the consciousness of all the three sorts can be a perfect effect 
of a causal circumstance -- sometimes a circumstance both internal and external to a 
head. To put this differently and with Davidson and Anomalous Monism is mind, all 
consciousness is subject to psychophysical laws, but some escapes psychoneural 
laws.
Finally, each of the neural events or processes with respect to any consciousness 
whatever is in a clear sense sufficient or necessitating. That is of course the sense in 
which, in a certain circumstance where everything else is on hand, including the 
dryness of the match, a striking of it is sufficient for or necessitates a lighting. 
   Do you say, despite all this, that current neuroscience falsifies consciousness as 
existence because the latter theory allows that some consciousnessness -- roughly 
speaking, seeing -- depends not only on brain events? Well, I don't agree, but I don't 
mind the possibility of falsification at all. The theory is testable -- that's fine. 
Certainly, despite the independent virtues of each, science and philosophy are 
continuous, as Quine rightly believed (Hookway, 1988). 
   This is also the time to make some remarks on four propositions, mainly 
philosophical, to which neuroscience pertains. 
There is the proposition of brain-mind supervenience: consciousness cannot change 
without a neural change, but a relevant neural state can be replaced by another 
without a change in consciousness (Davidson, 1980; Kim, 1998, pp. 148-153). That 
is, the neural-consciousness relation is many-one. 
With respect to some consciousness, this is denied by the theory of consciousness as 
existence, simply because supervenience is a doctrine of neural sufficient conditions 
everywhere. Again, this is not upsetting. It leaves open the possibility, for example, 
that there can be different instantiations of a necessary condition.
   Epiphenomenalism is the doctrine or group of doctrines that consciousness is a 
side-effect of neural activity, but has no effects itself. The efficacy of consciousness 
is denied. It is a pleasure to record that consciousness as existence, particularly in 
connection with perceptual consciousness, makes epiphenomenalism the mad 
proposition that that the external world, so to speak, is causally inefficacious with 
respect to consciousness. 
It is as much of a pleasure to record that consciousness as existence leaves no scintilla 
of doubt about the evolutionary role of consciousness. If worlds of perceptual 
consciousness aren't selective with respect to species, what is?
Finally, in passing, it is clear that consciousness as existence shares with what is 
called externalism or anti-individualism the truth that much of consciousness is 
outside of heads (Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979). But consciousness as existence comes 
to its own different position without reliance on what can seem to be unlikely 
doctrines about meaning -- and without having Hegel in its past (Honderich, 1993).
   To come back to neuroscience and the rest of science, let me make more explicit 
the rest of their relation to the theory of consciousness in hand. The short story here is 
that all of consciousness is a subject for science. No part or aspect of consciousness --
no qualia so-called, no 'insides' so-called of brain events, no curious facts that give 
Fregean sense rather than reference to terms or the vocabulary of consciousness 
(Wilson, 1980) -- nothing with respect to consciousness is beyond scientific inquiry 
and understanding.
   Neuroscience, and also cognitive science when it is not engaged in philosophy, has 
the correlates of consciousness -- necessary or sufficient -- within its subject-matter. 
So too the perceptual processes that are fundamental to the dependency of perceptual 
consciousness on the physical world at its bottom level. So too, plainly, the 
representations etc. that are the stuff of reflective and affective consciousness. 
The only qualification necessary is that these facts are not all public facts but in the 
defined sense subjective. But subjectivity, of course, is exactly what we expect of 
consciousness. And of course, there is no barrier to the objective understanding of 
what is not public, of what is subjective in a plain and unmysterious sense.
   The short story of the relation of neuroscience to consciousness as existence, again, 
is that neuroscience is freed from any lingering worry that consciousness is outside its 
grasp. That worry has been owed to the idea that its subjectivity is an elusive fact not 
open to science. Plainly it is.
8. Postcript on Construction or Reconstruction
   There remains a larger matter to be glanced at rather than opened, let alone 
considered. It was remarked at the start that consciousness as existence is presented 
not as a piece of conceptual analysis, but as a construction or reconstruction of our 
ordinary conception of consciousness. It could have been said, too, that it is not a 
reporting of any scientific conception, but, perhaps, a reconstruction of some. What 
goes along with this is a certain diffidence about claiming truth for the theory.
   There is a good deal of philosophy of science and other philosophy relevant to this 
diffidence. There is conventionalism, originally associated with Poincare (1913) and 
now in a way with Quine (1953). It is to the effect that scientific theories are 
conventions, or conventions in part, somehow a matter of choice rather than 
observation or truth. The same can be said of philosophical theories. Instrumentalism, 
which makes theories into useful instruments, wholly or partly, is along the same 
lines (van Fraassen, 1980). 
Astronomy, and the philosophy of physics from waves and particles onward also 
come to mind, as does the under-determination of theory by data. So too competing 
geometries, and Carnap's alternative languages with different formation and 
transformation rules, and Kuhn's paradigms in science (1962), and the simple fact 
that all theories seem to fail in the end. Simpler than all this are familiar facts about 
different ways of looking at a thing, turning them around, different classifications, 
and such psychological illusions as the duck-rabbit.
   So, can we say the theory of consciousness as existence, which puts perceptual 
consciousness outside the head, and makes all consciousness more or less what other 
theories call the content of consciousness, is somehow and to some extent a matter of 
simplicity, ontological economy, usefulness, convenience, fruitfulness, or elegance? 
All of these considerations have been said to make a theory a matter of choice rather 
than truth in the best sense, which of course is correspondence to facts, and more 
particularly things.
   To cut this last story short, here are a few propositions. 
We might well get a little freer in our thinking about consciousness, hang looser, see 
that there are things to be said for different conceptions. We might carry several 
forward together. 
It isn't the case, despite this, that at bottom there is some basis for any theory that is 
wholly detached from truth. I suspect the supposedly separate virtues of theories --
simplicity, ontological economy and the rest -- are really indicators or promisers of 
more truth. You can't say that inconsistent theories are both true, and you can't 
whistle it either.
Consciousness as existence is indeed a construction or reconstruction, and maybe it 
should not clear the board, but in my view it comes closer than anything else to being 
true to the criteria of adequacy for theories of consciousness.
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A slightly revised version of the paper, along with four other papers on the theme of 
Consciousness as Existence, appears in On Consciousness (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004).
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